

Differential propagation analysis of KECCAK

Joan DAEMEN and Gilles VAN ASSCHE

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
Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Trails in KECCAK- f
- 3 Generating all trails up to some weight
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Differential trails in iterated mappings



- Trail: sequence of differences
- $DP(Q)$: fraction of pairs that exhibit q_i differences

Differential trails and weight

$$w = -\log_2(DP)$$

$$w(Q) = w_{0,1} + w_{1,2} + w_{2,3} + w_{3,4} + w_{4,5} + w_{5,6}$$

Q: $q_0 \rightarrow \text{R} \rightarrow q_1 \rightarrow \text{R} \rightarrow q_2 \rightarrow \text{R} \rightarrow q_3 \rightarrow \text{R} \rightarrow q_4 \rightarrow \text{R} \rightarrow q_5 \rightarrow \text{R} \rightarrow q_6$


If *independent* rounds and $w(Q) < b$: $\#\text{pairs}(Q) \approx 2^{b-w(Q)}$

Different design approaches

- Rijndael-inspired: strong alignment
 - estimating $\#pairs(Q)$ from Q : easy
 - easy demonstration of strong trail weight bounds
 - still, truncated trails, rebound attack, ...
- ARX
 - estimating $\#pairs(Q)$ from Q : hard
 - no strong trail weight bounds
 - revert to pre-DC/LC folklore such as *avalanche effect*
- KECCAK: weak alignment
 - $\#pairs(Q)$ from Q : easy
 - cryptanalysis seems hard
 - ...but proving strong lower bounds also

KECCAK-f: an iterative permutation

Operates on 3D state:



- (5×5) -bit **slices**
- 2^ℓ -bit **lanes**
- parameter $0 \leq \ell < 7$

Round function with 5 steps:


- θ : mixing layer
- ρ : inter-slice bit transposition
- π : intra-slice bit transposition
- χ : non-linear layer
- ι : round constants

rounds: $12 + 2\ell$ for width $b = 2^\ell 25$

- 12 rounds in KECCAK-f[25]
- 24 rounds in KECCAK-f[1600]

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
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
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This work

- Security of KECCAK relies on **absence** of exploitable trails ...and not on presumed hardness of finding them
- Bounds for small versions of KECCAK- f


b	bound
25	30 per 5 rounds tight
50	54 per 6 rounds tight
100	146 per 16 rounds non-tight
200	206 per 18 rounds non-tight
1600	this work

- Inspired by similar efforts for
 - Noekeon [Nessie, 2000]
 - MD6 [Rivest et al., SHA-3 2008][Heilman, Ecrypt Hash 2011]

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
Trails in KECCAK-f



Round: linear step $\lambda = \pi \circ \rho \circ \theta$ and non-linear step χ

- a_i fully determines $b_i = \lambda(a_i)$
- χ has degree 2: $w(b_{i-1})$ independent of a_i

Trails in KECCAK-f




For KECCAK-f:

$w(Q)$: # conditions on intermediate state bits

b : # degree of freedom

Trail generation techniques

- Given a trail, we can extend it:
 - forward: iterate a_{r+1} over $\mathcal{A}(b_r)$
 - backward: iterate b_{-1} over all differences χ^{-1} -compatible with $a_0 = \lambda^{-1}(b_0)$
- Tree search:
 - extension can be done recursively
 - pruning as soon as weight exceeds some limit




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First-order approach

Fact

An r -round trail Q with $w(Q) \leq T$ has at least one b_i with weight $\leq T/r$




Generating trails up to weight T , first order approach

- Generate $\mathcal{V}_1 = \{b \mid w(b) \leq t_{\text{avg}}\}$ with $t_{\text{avg}} = T/r$
- $\forall 0 \leq i < r$, iterate b_i over \mathcal{V}_1
 - extend forward up to b_{r-1}
 - extend backward down to b_0
 - prune as soon as weight exceeds T

Limits of first-order approach

\mathcal{V}_1 grows quickly with t_{avg} and KECCAK- f width:




Definitions: minimum reverse weight and trail cores

■ Minimum reverse weight:

$$w^{\text{rev}}(a) \triangleq \min_{b : a \in \mathcal{A}(b)} w(b)$$

■ Can be used to lower bound of set of trails

■ Trail core: set of trails with b_1, b_2, \dots in common




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
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Second-order approach

Observation

For most low-weight a , $b = \lambda(a)$ has high weight and vice versa




Generating trails up to weight T , second order approach

- Generate $\mathcal{V}_2 = \{b \mid b = \lambda(a) \text{ and } w^{\text{rev}}(a) + w(b) \leq 2t_{\text{avg}}\}$
- $\forall 0 \leq i < r$, iterate b_i over \mathcal{V}_2
 - extend forward up to b_{r-1}
 - extend backward down to b_0
 - prune as soon as weight exceeds T


But how does the size of \mathcal{V}_2 behave with t_{avg} ?

θ , the mixing layer




- Compute parity $c_{x,z}$ of each column
- Add to each cell the parities of two nearby columns

θ , the mixing layer



- Single-bit parity flips already 10 bits
- Other linear mapping ρ and π just move bits around


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
- Effect collapses if parity is zero
- The kernel

Limits of second-order approach

- \mathcal{V}_2 still grows quickly with t_{avg} and KECCAK- f width
- Reason: \mathcal{V}_2 contains states in kernel




Third-order approach: dealing with the kernel




- \mathcal{V}_3 : trail cores (b, d) with $w^{\text{rev}}(a) + w(b) + w(d) \leq 3t_{\text{avg}}$
 - $a = \lambda^{-1}(b)$ is in the kernel
 - $c = \lambda^{-1}(d)$ is in the kernel
- Elements of \mathcal{V}_3 can then be extended as usual

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Tame states




- **Tame state:** value of b that satisfies two conditions
 - 1 $a = \lambda^{-1}(b)$ is in the kernel
 - 2 Intersection of $\mathcal{A}(b)$ and kernel is not empty
- Second condition can be handled slice-by-slice:
 - **orbital:** two bits in the same column
 - **knot:** at least 3 active bits
- First condition: bits occur in pairs per column in a
 - Combined with orbitals these form **chains** between knots

Chains

Sequence of active bits p_i with:

- p_{2i} and p_{2i+1} are in same column in a
- p_{2i+1} and p_{2i} are in same column in b




Third-order approach

- We efficiently generate \mathcal{V}_3 using this representation
 - set of chains between knots
 - plus some circular chains: **vortices**
- Full coverage guaranteed by
 - monotonous weight prediction function
 - well-defined order of chains


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An in-kernel 3-round trail with a single knot



An in-kernel 3-round trail with a vortex




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Conclusions

- Current bound for KECCAK-f[1600]:
 - scanned all 3-round trails up to weight 36
 - after extension: minimum weight 74 for 6-round trails
- Work in progress:
 - improving bounds by increasing t_{avg}
 - probabilistic evidence for absence of low-weight trails



Questions?

Thanks for your attention!



<http://keccak.noekeon.org/>