CryptoDB
Security analysis of SPAKE2+
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| Presentation: | Slides |
| Abstract: | We show that a slight variant of Protocol SPAKE2+, which was presented but not analyzed in [Cash, Kiltz, Shoup 2008], is a secure *asymmetric* password-authenticated key exchange protocol (PAKE), meaning that the protocol still provides good security guarantees even if a server is compromised and the password file stored on the server is leaked to an adversary. The analysis is done in the UC framework (i.e., a simulation-based security model), under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, and modeling certain hash functions as random oracles. The main difference between our variant and the original Protocol SPAKE2+ is that our variant includes standard key confirmation flows; also, adding these flows allows some slight simplification to the remainder of the protocol. Along the way, we also (i) provide the first proof (under the same assumptions) that a slight variant of Protocol SPAKE2 from [Abdalla, Pointcheval 2005] is a secure *symmetric* PAKE in the UC framework (previous security proofs were all in the weaker BPR framework [Bellare, Pointcheval, Rogaway 2000]); (ii) provide a proof (under very similar assumptions) that a variant of Protocol SPAKE2+ that is currently being standardized is also a secure asymmetric PAKE; (iii) repair several problems in earlier UC formulations of secure symmetric and asymmetric PAKE. |
Video from TCC 2020
BibTeX
@article{tcc-2020-30638,
title={Security analysis of SPAKE2+},
booktitle={Theory of Cryptography},
publisher={Springer},
author={Victor Shoup},
year=2020
}