International Association for Cryptologic Research

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Survey: Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example

Authors:
Gabrielle De Micheli , University of California, San Diego
Nadia Heninger , University of California, San Diego
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DOI: 10.62056/ahjbksdja
URL: https://cic.iacr.org//p/1/1/28
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Abstract:

Side-channel attacks targeting cryptography may leak only partial or indirect information about the secret keys. There are a variety of techniques in the literature for recovering secret keys from partial information. In this work, we survey several of the main families of partial key recovery algorithms for RSA, (EC)DSA, and (elliptic curve) Diffie-Hellman, the classical public-key cryptosystems in common use today. We categorize the known techniques by the structure of the information that is learned by the attacker, and give simplified examples for each technique to illustrate the underlying ideas.

BibTeX
@article{cic-2024-34107,
  title={Survey: Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example},
  journal={cic},
  publisher={International Association for Cryptologic Research},
  volume={1, Issue 1},
  url={https://cic.iacr.org//p/1/1/28},
  doi={10.62056/ahjbksdja},
  author={Gabrielle De Micheli and Nadia Heninger},
  year=2024
}