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Reusable Online-Efficient Commitments

Authors:
Nir Bitansky , New York University and Tel Aviv University
Omer Paneth , Tel Aviv University
Dana Shamir , Tel Aviv University
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-68397-8_1 (login may be required)
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Presentation: Slides
Conference: CRYPTO 2024
Abstract: An {\em online-efficient commitment} is a succinct locally-openable commitment, where the bulk of the sender work is done offline, generating an encoding $\tilde x$ of the committed data $x$. In the online phase, both the sender, given random access to $\tilde x$, and receiver run in polylogarithmic time in the length of $x$. Online-efficient commitments were recently constructed under the standard assumption of RingLWE by Lin, Mook, and Wichs, but with a significant caveat: {\em they are not reusable.} Their commitments are privately verifiable and cease to be binding if a malicious sender can learn whether the receiver accepts or rejects in repeated decommitment requests. We construct the first {\em reusable} online-efficient commitment under a standard assumption, RingLWE. A main component in our analysis is a leakage lemma by Chung, Kalai, Liu, and Raz (CRYPTO `11) introduced in the context of {\em streaming delegation schemes.}
BibTeX
@inproceedings{crypto-2024-34271,
  title={Reusable Online-Efficient Commitments},
  publisher={Springer-Verlag},
  doi={10.1007/978-3-031-68397-8_1},
  author={Nir Bitansky and Omer Paneth and Dana Shamir},
  year=2024
}