International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Liu Zhang , School of Cyber Engineering, Xidian University, State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, P.O.Box 5159

Zilong Wang , School of Cyber Engineering, Xidian University, State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, P.O.Box 5159

Baocang Wang , State Key Laboratory of Integrated Service Networks, Xidian University

DOI: 10.62056/ay11wa3y6

URL: https://cic.iacr.org//p/1/3/13

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Our first objective is to enhance the capabilities of differential-neural distinguishers by applying more deep-learning techniques, focusing on handling more rounds and improving accuracy. Inspired by the Inception Block in GoogLeNet, we adopted a design that uses multiple parallel convolutional layers with varying kernel sizes before the residual block to capture multi-dimensional information. Additionally, we expanded the convolutional kernels in the residual blocks, enlarging the network's receptive field. In the case of Speck32/64, our efforts yield accuracy improvements in rounds 6, 7, and 8, enabling the successful training of a 9-round differential-neural distinguisher. As for Simon32/64, we developed a differential-neural distinguisher capable of effectively handling 12 rounds while achieving noteworthy accuracy enhancements in rounds 9, 10, and 11.

Additionally, we utilized neutral bits to ensure the required data distribution for launching a successful key recovery attack when using multiple-ciphertext pairs as input for the neural network. Meanwhile, we redefined the formula for time complexity based on the differences in prediction speeds of the distinguisher between a single-core CPU and a GPU. Combining these various advancements allows us to considerably reduce the time and data complexity of key recovery attacks on 13-round Speck32/64. Furthermore, we used knowledge distillation techniques to reduce the model size, accelerating the distinguisher's prediction speed and reducing the time complexity. In particular, we achieved a successful 14-round key recovery attack by exhaustively guessing a 1-round subkey. For Simon32/64, we accomplished a 17-round key recovery attack for the first time and reduced the time complexity of the 16-round key recovery attack.