CryptoDB
The Uber-Knowledge Assumption: A Bridge to the AGM
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| Abstract: | The generic-group model (GGM) and the algebraic-group model (AGM) have been exceptionally successful in proving the security of many classical and modern cryptosystems. These models, however, come with standard-model uninstantiability results, raising the question of whether the schemes analyzed under them can be based on firmer standard-model footing. We formulate the uber-knowledge (UK) assumption, a standard-model assumption that naturally extends the uber-assumption family to knowledge-type problems. We justify the soundness of UK in both the bilinear GGM and the bilinear AGM. Along the way we extend these models to account for hashing into groups, an adversarial capability that is available in many concrete groups—In contrast to standard assumptions, hashing may affect the validity of knowledge assumptions. These results, in turn, enable a modular approach to security in the GGM and the AGM. As example applications, we use the UK assumption to prove knowledge soundness of Groth's zero-knowledge SNARK (EUROCRYPT 2016) and of KZG polynomial commitments (ASIACRYPT 2010) in the standard model, where for the former we reuse the existing proof in the AGM without hashing. |
BibTeX
@article{cic-2024-34842,
title={The Uber-Knowledge Assumption: A Bridge to the AGM},
journal={cic},
publisher={International Association for Cryptologic Research},
volume={1, Issue 3},
url={https://cic.iacr.org//p/1/3/31},
doi={10.62056/anr-zoja5},
author={Balthazar Bauer and Pooya Farshim and Patrick Harasser and Markulf Kohlweiss},
year=2024
}