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Information Theoretic Evaluation of Raccoon's Side-Channel Leakage
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| Abstract: | Raccoon is a lattice-based scheme submitted to the NIST 2022 call for additional post-quantum signatures. One of its main selling points is that its design is intrinsically easy to mask against side-channel attacks. So far, Raccoon's physical security guarantees were only stated in the abstract probing model. In this paper, we discuss how these probing security results translate into guarantees in more realistic leakage models. We also highlight that this translation differs from what is usually observed (e.g., in symmetric cryptography), due to the algebraic structure of Raccoon's operations. For this purpose, we perform an in-depth information theoretic evaluation of Raccoon's most innovative part, namely the AddRepNoise function which allows generating its arithmetic shares on-the-fly. Our results are twofold. First, we show that the resulting shares do not enforce a statistical security order (i.e., the need for the side-channel adversary to estimate higher-order moments of the leakage distribution), as usually expected when masking. Second, we observe that the first-order leakage on the (large) random coefficients manipulated by Raccoon cannot be efficiently turned into leakage on the (smaller) coefficients of its long-term secret. Concretely, our information theoretic evaluations for relevant leakage functions also suggest that Raccoon's masked implementations can ensure high security with less shares than suggested by a conservative analysis in the probing model. |
BibTeX
@article{cic-2024-34855,
title={Information Theoretic Evaluation of Raccoon's Side-Channel Leakage},
journal={cic},
publisher={International Association for Cryptologic Research},
volume={1, Issue 3},
url={https://cic.iacr.org//p/1/3/44},
doi={10.62056/abkp2c3w9p},
author={Dinal Kamel and François-Xavier Standaert and Olivier Bronchain},
year=2024
}