CryptoDB
SGX.Fail: How Secrets Get eXtracted
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| Download: | |
| Presentation: | Slides |
| Abstract: | Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) promises an isolated execution environment, protected from all software running on the machine. As such, numerous works have sought to leverage SGX to provide confidentiality and integrity guarantees for code running in adversarial environments. In the past few years however, SGX has come under heavy fire, threatened by numerous side channel attacks. With Intel repeatedly patching SGX to regain security, in this paper we set out to explore the effectiveness of SGX's update mechanisms to prevent attacks on real-world deployments. To that aim, we study two commercial SGX applications. First, we investigate the Secret network, an SGX-backed blockchain aiming to provide privacy preserving smart contracts. Next, we also consider PowerDVD, a UHD Blu-Ray Digital Rights Management (DRM) software licensed to play discs on general purpose computers. We show that in both cases vendors are unable to meet security goals originally envisioned for their products, presumably due to SGX's long mitigation timelines and a difficult manual update process. This in turn forces vendors into making difficult security/usability trade offs, resulting in severe security compromises. |
| Video: | https://youtu.be/608NQdTn39Q?t=61 |
BibTeX
@misc{rwc-2023-35451,
title={SGX.Fail: How Secrets Get eXtracted},
note={Video at \url{https://youtu.be/608NQdTn39Q?t=61}},
howpublished={Talk given at RWC 2023},
author={Bader AlBassam and Adam Batori and Alex Seto and Stephan van Schaik and Thomas Yurek and Christina Garman and Daniel Genkin and Andrew Miller and Eyal Ronen and Yuval Yarom},
year=2023
}