CryptoDB
On the (in)security of ElGamal in OpenPGP
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| Presentation: | Slides |
| Abstract: | We present our recent cryptanalytical results concerning the OpenPGP standard and a number of its most popular implementations. Our corresponding research paper was accepted to CCS'21 and was presented last November. As the OpenPGP encryption standard is widely adopted in practice and has millions of users that critically depend on it, and we found its most used implementations, prominently including \texttt{gnupg}, crucially flawed, we believe our results are of relevance and interest for the RWC'22 audience. In a nutshell, our attacks exploit that different OpenPGP implementations assume different interpretations of ElGamal encryption (group structure, generators, etc). |
BibTeX
@misc{rwc-2022-35500,
title={On the (in)security of ElGamal in OpenPGP},
note={Presentation at \url{https://iacr.org/submit/files/slides/2022/rwc/rwc2022/76/slides.pdf}},
howpublished={Talk given at RWC 2022},
author={Bertram Poettering and Luca De Feo and Alessandro Sorniotti},
year=2022
}