CryptoDB
Protecting Cryptography against Self-Incrimination
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| Abstract: | This talk explores a small yet crucial part of the U.S. Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination called the "foregone conclusion doctrine." This doctrine concerns a new chapter of the Crypto Wars, in which the government issues subpoenas that compel people to decrypt their own devices, under the penalty of contempt of court if they do not comply. This talk will survey the use of compelled decryption by courts, provide a legal and technical description of the doctrine, and use a simulation-based definition to analyze the compellability of various cryptographic systems. |
| Video: | https://youtu.be/-mBlQVEXcB8?t=1069 |
BibTeX
@misc{rwc-2021-35528,
title={Protecting Cryptography against Self-Incrimination},
note={Video at \url{https://youtu.be/-mBlQVEXcB8?t=1069}},
howpublished={Talk given at RWC 2021},
author={Sarah Scheffler and Mayank Varia},
year=2021
}