International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Impossible differential cryptanalysis is very important in the field of symmetric ciphers. Currently, there are many automatic search approaches to find impossible differentials. However, these methods have two underlying assumptions: Markov cipher assumption and key independence assumption. Actually, these two assumptions are not true in ARX ciphers, especially lightweight ones. In this paper, we study the impossible differentials in ARX cipher under weak keys for the first time. Firstly, we propose several accurate difference propagation properties on consecutive two and three modular additions. Then, these properties are applied to four typical local constructions composed of two consecutive modular additions, two modular additions with a rotation operation, xoring secret key or constant in the middle, to find impossible differentials under weak keys or special constants. What’s more, we propose a more accurate difference propagation property on three consecutive modular additions. It can be used to find impossible differentials on more complex local constructions under weak keys or special constants. In practical ciphers, these impossible differentials on local constructions can be used to find contradictions. Lastly, combining our new findings with traditional automatic search methods for impossible differentials, we propose a framework to find impossible differentials in ARX ciphers under weak keys. As applications, we apply the framework to SPECK-32/64, LEA and CHAM-64/128. As a result, we find two 8-round impossible differentials for SPECK-32/64 under 260 weak keys, and one 11-round impossible differential for LEA under 2k−1 weak keys, where k is the key size. These impossible differentials can start from any round. Furthermore, we find two 22-round impossible differentials for CHAM-64/128 under 2127 weak keys starting from certain rounds. As far as we know, all these impossible differentials are longer than previous ones.

In this paper, a method for searching correlations between the binary stream of Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) and the keystream of SNOW-V and SNOW-Vi is presented based on the technique of approximation to composite functions. With the aid of the linear relationship between the four taps of LFSR input into Finite State Machine (FSM) at three consecutive clocks, we present an automatic search model based on the SAT/SMT technique and search out a series of linear approximation trails with high correlation. By exhausting the intermediate masks, we find a binary linear approximation with a correlation $-2^{-47.76}$. Using such approximation, we propose a correlation attack on SNOW-V with an expected time complexity $2^{246.53}$, a memory complexity $2^{238.77}$ and $2^{237.5}$ keystream words generated by the same key and Initial Vector (IV). For SNOW-Vi, we provide a binary linear approximation with the same correlation and mount a correlation attack with the same complexity as that of SNOW-V. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first known efficient attack on full SNOW-V and SNOW-Vi, which is better than the exhaustive key search. The results indicate that neither SNOW-V nor SNOW-Vi can guarantee the 256-bit security level if we ignore the design constraint that the maximum length of keystream for a single pair of key and IV is less than $2^{64}$.

Lizard is a lightweight stream cipher proposed by Hamann, Krause and Meier in IACR ToSC 2017. It has a Grain-like structure with two state registers of size 90 and 31 bits. The cipher uses a 120-bit secret key and a 64-bit IV. The authors claim that Lizard provides 80-bit security against key recovery attacks and a 60-bit security against distinguishing attacks. In this paper, we present an assortment of results and observations on Lizard. First, we show that by doing 258 random trials it is possible to find a set of 264 triplets (K, IV0, IV1) such that the Key-IV pairs (K, IV0) and (K, IV1) produce identical keystream bits. Second, we show that by performing only around 228 random trials it is possible to obtain 264 Key-IV pairs (K0, IV0) and (K1, IV1) that produce identical keystream bits. Thereafter, we show that one can construct a distinguisher for Lizard based on IVs that produce shifted keystream sequences. The process takes around 251.5 random IV encryptions (with encryption required to produce 218 keystream bits) and around 276.6 bits of memory. Next, we propose a key recovery attack on a version of Lizard with the number of initialization rounds reduced to 223 (out of 256) based on IV collisions. We then outline a method to extend our attack to 226 rounds. Our results do not affect the security claims of the designers.