International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Christopher Patton

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2022
RWC
Standardizing MPC for Privacy-preserving Measurement
Operating a large, complex, Internet-based application usually requires measuring the behavior of the application's users. Often the purpose of these measurements is not to build profiles about individual users, but to shed light on overall trends that might point to performance bottlenecks, user-experience issues, bugs, or attack vectors. Recent advances in cryptography, e.g., Prio (NSDI 2017), have made it possible to compute these aggregates without revealing individual measurements to the service provider. This talk will describe the IETF's initial effort to standardize some of these techniques.
2020
CRYPTO
Quantifying the Security Cost of Migrating Protocols to Practice 📺
Christopher Patton Thomas Shrimpton
We give a framework for relating the quantitative, concrete security of a "reference'' protocol (say, one appearing in an academic paper) to that of some derived, "real'' protocol (say, appearing in a cryptographic standard). It is based on the indifferentiability framework of Maurer, Renner, and Holenstein (MRH), whose application has been exclusively focused upon non-interactive cryptographic primitives, e.g., hash functions and Feistel networks. Our extension of MRH is supported by a clearly defined execution model, and two composition lemmata, all formalized in a modern pseudocode language. Together, these allow for precise statements about game-based security properties of cryptographic objects (interactive or not) at various levels of abstraction, As a real-world application, we design and prove tight security bounds for a potential TLS 1.3 extension that integrates the SPAKE2 password-authenticated key-exchange into the existing handshake. (This is a problem of current interest to the IETF.)
2019
CRYPTO
Security in the Presence of Key Reuse: Context-Separable Interfaces and Their Applications 📺
Christopher Patton Thomas Shrimpton
Key separation is often difficult to enforce in practice. While key reuse can be catastrophic for security, we know of a number of cryptographic schemes for which it is provably safe. But existing formal models, such as the notions of joint security (Haber-Pinkas, CCS ’01) and agility (Acar et al., EUROCRYPT ’10), do not address the full range of key-reuse attacks—in particular, those that break the abstraction of the scheme, or exploit protocol interactions at a higher level of abstraction. This work attends to these vectors by focusing on two key elements: the game that codifies the scheme under attack, as well as its intended adversarial model; and the underlying interface that exposes secret key operations for use by the game. Our main security experiment considers the implications of using an interface (in practice, the API of a software library or a hardware platform such as TPM) to realize the scheme specified by the game when the interface is shared with other unspecified, insecure, or even malicious applications. After building up a definitional framework, we apply it to the analysis of two real-world schemes: the EdDSA signature algorithm and the Noise protocol framework. Both provide some degree of context separability, a design pattern for interfaces and their applications that aids in the deployment of secure protocols.
2017
CRYPTO