International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Vukašin Karadžić

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2025
EUROCRYPT
Committing Authenticated Encryption: Generic Transforms with Hash Functions
Shan Chen Vukašin Karadžić
Recent applications and attacks have highlighted the need for authenticated encryption (AE) schemes to achieve the so-called committing security beyond privacy and authenticity. As a result, several generic solutions have been proposed to transform a non-committing AE scheme to a committing one, for both basic unique-nonce security and advanced misuse-resistant (MR) security. We observe that all existing practical generic transforms are subject to at least one of the following limitations: (i) not committing to the entire encryption context, (ii) involving non-standard primitives, (iii) not being a black-box transform, (iv) providing limited committing security. Furthermore, so far, there has been no generic transform that can directly elevate a basic AE scheme to a committing AE scheme that offers MR security. Our work fills these gaps by developing black-box generic transforms that crucially rely on hash functions, which are well standardized and widely deployed. First, we construct three basic transforms that combine AE with a single hash function, which we call HtAE, AEaH and EtH. They all guarantee strong security, and EtH can be applied to both AE and basic privacy-only encryption schemes. Next, for MR security, we propose two advanced hash-based transforms that we call AEtH and chaSIV. AEtH is an MRAE-preserving transform that adds committing security to an MR-secure AE scheme. chaSIV is the first generic transform that can directly elevate basic AE to one with both committing and MR security; moreover, chaSIV also works with arbitrary privacy-only encryption schemes. Both of them feature a simple design and ensure strong security. For performance evaluation, we compare our transforms to similar existing ones, both in theory and through practical implementations. The results show that our AEaH achieves the highest practical efficiency among basic transforms, while AEtH excels in MRAE-preserving transforms. Our MRAE-lifting transform chaSIV demonstrates comparable performance to MRAE-preserving ones and surpasses them for messages larger than approximately 360 bytes; for longer messages, it even outperforms the benchmark, non-committing standardized AES-GCM-SIV.
2023
ASIACRYPT
Populating the Zoo of Rugged Pseudorandom Permutations
Jean Paul Degabriele Vukašin Karadžić
A Rugged Pseudorandom Permutation (RPRP) is a variable-input-length tweakable cipher satisfying a security notion that is intermediate between tweakable PRP and tweakable SPRP. It was introduced at CRYPTO 2022 by Degabriele and Karadžić, who additionally showed how to generically convert such a primitive into nonce-based and nonce-hiding AEAD schemes satisfying either misuse-resistance or release-of-unverified-plaintext security as well as Nonce-Set AEAD which has applications in protocols like QUIC and DTLS. Their work shows that RPRPs are powerful and versatile cryptographic primitives. However, the RPRP security notion itself can seem rather contrived, and the motivation behind it is not immediately clear. Moreover, they only provided a single RPRP construction, called UIV, which puts into question the generality of their modular approach and whether other instantiations are even possible. In this work, we address this question positively by presenting new RPRP constructions, thereby validating their modular approach and providing further justification in support of the RPRP security definition. Furthermore, we present a more refined view of their results by showing that strictly weaker RPRP variants, which we introduce, suffice for many of their transformations. From a theoretical perspective, our results show that the well-known three-round Feistel structure achieves stronger security as a permutation than a mere pseudorandom permutation—as was established in the seminal result by Luby and Rackoff. We conclude on a more practical note by showing how to extend the left domain of one RPRP construction for applications that require larger values in order to meet the desired level of security.
2022
CRYPTO
Overloading the Nonce: Rugged PRPs, Nonce-Set AEAD, and Order-Resilient Channels 📺
Jean Paul Degabriele Vukašin Karadžić
We introduce a new security notion that lies right in between pseudorandom permutations (PRPs) and strong pseudorandom permutations (SPRPs). We call this new security notion and any (tweakable) cipher that satisfies it a rugged pseudorandom permutation (RPRP). Rugged pseudorandom permutations lend themselves to some interesting applications, have practical benefits, and lead to novel cryptographic constructions. Analogous to the encode-then-encipher paradigm first proposed by Bellare and Rogaway and later extended by Shrimpton and Terashima, we can transform a variable-length tweakable RPRP into an AEAD scheme. However, we can construct RPRPs more efficiently as they are weaker primitives than SPRPs (the notion traditionally required by the encode-then-encipher paradigm). We can construct RPRPs using two-pass schemes, whereas SPRPs typically require three passes over the input data. We also identify new transformations that yield RUP-secure AEAD schemes with more compact ciphertexts than previously known. Further extending this approach, we arrive at a new generalized notion of authenticated encryption and a matching construction, which we refer to as nonce-set AEAD. Nonce-set AEAD is particularly well-suited in the context of secure channels, like QUIC and DTLS, that operate over unreliable transports and employ a window mechanism at the receiver's end of the channel. We conclude by presenting a generic construction for transforming a nonce-set AEAD scheme into an order-resilient secure channel. Our channel construction sheds new light on order-resilient channels and additionally leads to more compact ciphertexts when instantiated from RPRPs.