CryptoDB
Agathe Houzelot
Publications
Year
Venue
Title
2024
TCHES
On the (Im)possibility of Preventing Differential Computation Analysis with Internal Encodings
Abstract
White-box cryptography aims at protecting implementations of cryptographic algorithms against a very powerful attacker who controls the execution environment. The first defensive brick traditionally embedded in such implementations consists of encodings, which are bijections supposed to conceal sensitive data manipulated by the white-box. Several previous works have sought to evaluate the relevance of encodings to protect white-box implementations against grey-box attacks such as Differential Computation Analysis (DCA). However, these works have been either probabilistic or partial in nature. In particular, while they showed that DCA succeeds with high probability against AES white-box implementations protected by random encodings, they did not refute the existence of a particular class of encodings that could prevent the attack. One could thus wonder if carefully crafting specific encodings instead of drawing random bijections could be a solution.This article bridges the gap between preceding research efforts and investigates this question. We first focus on the protection of the S-box output and we show that no 4-bit encoding can actually protect this sensitive value against side-channel attacks. We then argue that the use of random 8-bit encodings is both necessary and sufficient, but that this assertion holds exclusively for the S-box output. Indeed, while we define a class of 8-bit encodings that actually prevents a classical DCA targeting the MixColumns output, we also explain how to adapt this attack and exploit the correlation traces in order to defeat even these specific encodings. Our work thus rules out the existence of a set of practical encodings that could be used to protect an AES white-box implementation against DCA-like attacks.
2022
TCHES
ECDSA White-Box Implementations: Attacks and Designs from CHES 2021 Challenge
Abstract
Despite the growing demand for software implementations of ECDSA secure against attackers with full control of the execution environment, scientific literature on ECDSA white-box design is scarce. The CHES 2021 WhibOx contest was thus held to assess the state-of-the-art and encourage relevant practical research, inviting developers to submit ECDSA white-box implementations and attackers to break the corresponding submissions.In this work, attackers (team TheRealIdefix) and designers (team zerokey) join to describe several attack techniques and designs used during this contest. We explain the methods used by the team TheRealIdefix, which broke the most challenges, and we show the efficiency of each of these methods against all the submitted implementations. Moreover, we describe the designs of the two winning challenges submitted by the team zerokey; these designs represent the ECDSA signature algorithm by a sequence of systems of low-degree equations, which are obfuscated with affine encodings and extra random variables and equations.The WhibOx contest has shown that securing ECDSA in the white-box model is an open and challenging problem, as no implementation survived more than two days. In this context, our designs provide a starting methodology for further research, and our attacks highlight the weak points future work should address.
Coauthors
- Guillaume Barbu (1)
- Ward Beullens (1)
- Laurent Castelnovi (1)
- Emmanuelle Dottax (1)
- Christophe Giraud (1)
- Agathe Houzelot (2)
- Chaoyun Li (1)
- Mohammad Mahzoun (1)
- Adrián Ranea (1)
- Jianrui Xie (1)