CryptoDB
Markus Wagner
Publications
Year
Venue
Title
2023
RWC
CryptOpt: Verified Compilation with Random Program Search for Cryptographic Primitives
Abstract
Most software domains rely on compilers to translate high-level code to multiple different machine languages, with performance not too much worse than what developers would have the patience to write directly in assembly language. However, cryptography has been an exception, where many performance-critical routines have been written directly in assembly (sometimes through metaprogramming layers). Some past work has shown how to do formal verification of that assembly, and other work has shown how to generate C code automatically along with formal proof, but with consequent performance penalties vs. the best-known assembly. We present CryptOpt, the first compilation pipeline that specializes high-level cryptographic functional programs into assembly code significantly faster than what GCC or Clang produce, with mechanized proof (in Coq) whose final theorem statement mentions little beyond the input functional program and the operational semantics of x86-64 assembly. On the optimization side, we apply randomized search through the space of assembly programs, with repeated automatic benchmarking on target CPUs. On the formal-verification side, we connect to the Fiat Cryptography framework (which translates functional programs into C-like IR code) and extend it with a new formally verified program-equivalence checker, incorporating a modest subset of known features of SMT solvers and symbolic-execution engines. The overall prototype is practical, e.g. producing new fastest-known implementations for the relatively new Intel i9 12G, of finite-field arithmetic for both Curve25519 (part of the TLS standard) and the Bitcoin elliptic curve secp256k1.
2021
RWC
Rosita: Towards Automatic Elimination of Power-Analysis
Abstract
Since their introduction over two decades ago, physical side-channel attacks have presented
a serious security threat. While many ciphers’ implementations employ masking techniques to
protect against such attacks, they often leak secret information due to unintended interactions in
the hardware. We present Rosita, a code rewrite engine that eliminates such leakage. Rosita
uses a leakage emulator which we amended to correctly emulate leakage from the target system
and then rewrites the code to eliminate that leakage. We use Rosita to automatically protect
masked implementations of AES and Xoodoo and show the absence of observable leakage at
only a 25% penalty to the performance.
Coauthors
- Lejla Batina (1)
- Adam Chlipala (1)
- Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup (1)
- Owen Conoly (1)
- Andres Erbsen (1)
- Daniel Genkin (1)
- Jason Gross (1)
- Joel Kuepper (1)
- Francesco Regazzoni (1)
- Niels Samwel (1)
- Madura A. Shelton (1)
- Chuyue Sun (1)
- Samuel Tian (1)
- Markus Wagner (2)
- David Wu (1)
- Yuval Yarom (2)