International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Apart from the actual CPU, modern server motherboards contain other auxiliary components, for example voltage regulators for power management. Those are connected to the CPU and the separate Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) via the I2C-based PMBus. In this paper, using the case study of the widely used Supermicro X11SSL motherboard, we show how remotely exploitable software weaknesses in the BMC (or other processors with PMBus access) can be used to access the PMBus and then perform hardware-based fault injection attacks on the main CPU. The underlying weaknesses include insecure firmware encryption and signing mechanisms, a lack of authentication for the firmware upgrade process and the IPMI KCS control interface, as well as the motherboard design (with the PMBus connected to the BMC and SMBus by default). First, we show that undervolting through the PMBus allows breaking the integrity guarantees of SGX enclaves, bypassing Intel’s countermeasures against previous undervolting attacks like Plundervolt/V0ltPwn. Second, we experimentally show that overvolting outside the specified range has the potential of permanently damaging Intel Xeon CPUs, rendering the server inoperable. We assess the impact of our findings on other server motherboards made by Supermicro and ASRock. Our attacks, dubbed PMFault, can be carried out by a privileged software adversary and do not require physical access to the server motherboard or knowledge of the BMC login credentials. We responsibly disclosed the issues reported in this paper to Supermicro and discuss possible countermeasures at different levels. To the best of our knowledge, the 12th generation of Supermicro motherboards, which was designed before we reported PMFault to Supermicro, is not vulnerable.

Car manufacturers deploy vehicle immobiliser systems in order to prevent car theft. However, in many cases the underlying cryptographic primitives used to authenticate a transponder are proprietary in nature and thus not open to public scrutiny. In this paper we publish the proprietary Texas Instruments DST80 cipher used in immobilisers of several manufacturers. Additionally, we expose serious flaws in immobiliser systems of major car manufacturers such as Toyota, Kia, Hyundai and Tesla. Specifically, by voltage glitching the firmware protection mechanisms of the microcontroller, we extracted the firmware from several immobiliser ECUs and reverse engineered the key diversification schemes employed within. We discovered that Kia and Hyundai immobiliser keys have only three bytes of entropy and that Toyota only relies on publicly readable information such as the transponder serial number and three constants to generate cryptographic keys. Furthermore, we present several practical attacks which can lead to recovering the full 80-bit cryptographic key in a matter of seconds or permanently disabling the transponder. Finally, even without key management or configuration issues, we demonstrate how an attacker can recover the cryptographic key using a profiled side-channel attack. We target the key loading procedure and investigate the practical applicability in the context of portability. Our work once again highlights the issues automotive vendors face in implementing cryptography securely.

The bootloader of an embedded microcontroller is responsible for guarding the device’s internal (flash) memory, enforcing read/write protection mechanisms. Fault injection techniques such as voltage or clock glitching have been proven successful in bypassing such protection for specific microcontrollers, but this often requires expensive equipment and/or exhaustive search of the fault parameters. When multiple glitches are required (e.g., when countermeasures are in place) this search becomes of exponential complexity and thus infeasible. Another challenge which makes embedded bootloaders notoriously hard to analyse is their lack of debugging capabilities.This paper proposes a grey-box approach that leverages binary analysis and advanced software exploitation techniques combined with voltage glitching to develop a powerful attack methodology against embedded bootloaders. We showcase our techniques with three real-world microcontrollers as case studies: 1) we combine static and on-chip dynamic analysis to enable a Return-Oriented Programming exploit on the bootloader of the NXP LPC microcontrollers; 2) we leverage on-chip dynamic analysis on the bootloader of the popular STM8 microcontrollers to constrain the glitch parameter search, achieving the first fully-documented multi-glitch attack on a real-world target; 3) we apply symbolic execution to precisely aim voltage glitches at target instructions based on the execution path in the bootloader of the Renesas 78K0 automotive microcontroller. For each case study, we show that using inexpensive, open-design equipment, we are able to efficiently breach the security of these microcontrollers and get full control of the protected memory, even when multiple glitches are required. Finally, we identify and elaborate on several vulnerable design patterns that should be avoided when implementing embedded bootloaders.

AUT64 is a 64-bit automotive block cipher with a 120-bit secret key used in a number of security sensitive applications such as vehicle immobilization and remote keyless entry systems. In this paper, we present for the first time full details of AUT64 including a complete specification and analysis of the block cipher, the associated authentication protocol, and its implementation in a widely-used vehicle immobiliser system that we have reverse engineered. Secondly, we reveal a number of cryptographic weaknesses in the block cipher design. Finally, we study the concrete use of AUT64 in a real immobiliser system, and pinpoint severe weaknesses in the key diversification scheme employed by the vehicle manufacturer. We present two key-recovery attacks based on the cryptographic weaknesses that, combined with the implementation flaws, break both the 8 and 24 round configurations of AUT64. Our attack on eight rounds requires only 512 plaintext-ciphertext pairs and, in the worst case, just 237.3 offline encryptions. In most cases, the attack can be executed within milliseconds on a standard laptop. Our attack on 24 rounds requires 2 plaintext-ciphertext pairs and 248.3 encryptions to recover the 120-bit secret key in the worst case. We have strong indications that a large part of the key is kept constant across vehicles, which would enable an attack using a single communication with the transponder and negligible offline computation.