CryptoDB
Samuel Ranellucci
Publications
Year
Venue
Title
2022
EUROCRYPT
Highly Efficient OT-Based Multiplication Protocols
📺
Abstract
We present a new OT-based two-party multiplication protocol that is almost as efficient as Gilboa's semi-honest protocol (Crypto '99), but has a high-level of security without further compilation. The achieved security suffices for many applications, and, assuming DDH, can be cheaply compiled into full security.
2018
CRYPTO
Optimizing Authenticated Garbling for Faster Secure Two-Party Computation
📺
Abstract
Wang et al. (CCS 2017) recently proposed a protocol for malicious secure two-party computation that represents the state-of-the-art with regard to concrete efficiency in both the single-execution and amortized settings, with or without preprocessing. We show here several optimizations of their protocol that result in a significant improvement in the overall communication and running time. Specifically:We show how to make the “authenticated garbling” at the heart of their protocol compatible with the half-gate optimization of Zahur et al. (Eurocrypt 2015). We also show how to avoid sending an information-theoretic MAC for each garbled row. These two optimizations give up to a 2.6$$\times $$× improvement in communication, and make the communication of the online phase essentially equivalent to that of state-of-the-art semi-honest secure computation.We show various optimizations to their protocol for generating AND triples that, overall, result in a 1.5$$\times $$× improvement in the communication and a 2$$\times $$× improvement in the computation for that step.
2018
ASIACRYPT
Secure Computation with Low Communication from Cross-Checking
Abstract
We construct new four-party protocols for secure computation that are secure against a single malicious corruption. Our protocols can perform computations over a binary ring, and require sending just 1.5 ring elements per party, per gate. In the special case of Boolean circuits, this amounts to sending 1.5 bits per party, per gate. One of our protocols is robust, yet requires almost no additional communication. Our key technique can be viewed as a variant of the “dual execution” approach, but, because we rely on four parties instead of two, we can avoid any leakage, achieving the standard notion of security.
Coauthors
- Ignacio Cascudo (2)
- Ivan Damgård (3)
- Oriol Farràs (1)
- S. Dov Gordon (1)
- Iftach Haitner (1)
- Jonathan Katz (1)
- Felipe Lacerda (1)
- Nikolaos Makriyannis (1)
- Michael Nielsen (1)
- Jesper Buus Nielsen (3)
- Samuel Ranellucci (9)
- Mike Rosulek (1)
- Alain Tapp (1)
- Eliad Tsfadia (1)
- Xiao Wang (2)
- Severin Winkler (1)
- Jürg Wullschleger (1)