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International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Rainer Steinwandt

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2024
ASIACRYPT
On the Semidirect Discrete Logarithm Problem in Finite Groups
We present an efficient quantum algorithm for solving the semidirect discrete logarithm problem (\SDLP) in \emph{any} finite group. The believed hardness of the semidirect discrete logarithm problem underlies more than a decade of works constructing candidate post-quantum cryptographic algorithms from non-abelian groups. We use a series of reduction results to show that it suffices to consider \SDLP in finite simple groups. We then apply the celebrated Classification of Finite Simple Groups to consider each family. The infinite families of finite simple groups admit, in a fairly general setting, linear algebraic attacks providing a reduction to the classical discrete logarithm problem. For the sporadic simple groups, we show that their inherent properties render them unsuitable for cryptographically hard \SDLP instances, which we illustrate via a Baby-Step Giant-Step style attack against \SDLP in the Monster Group. Our quantum \SDLP algorithm is fully constructive, up to the computation of maximal normal subgroups, for all but three remaining cases that appear to be gaps in the literature on constructive recognition of groups; for these cases \SDLP is no harder than finding a linear representation. We conclude that \SDLP is not a suitable post-quantum hardness assumption for any choice of finite group.
2018
TCHES
Extending Glitch-Free Multiparty Protocols to Resist Fault Injection Attacks
Side channel analysis and fault attacks are two powerful methods to analyze and break cryptographic implementations. At CHES 2011, Roche and Prouff applied secure multiparty computation to prevent side-channel attacks. While multiparty computation is known to be fault-resistant as well, the particular scheme used for side-channel protection does not currently offer this feature. This work introduces a new secure multiparty circuit to prevent both fault injection attacks and sidechannel analysis. The new scheme extends the Roche and Prouff scheme to make faults detectable. Arithmetic operations have been redesigned to propagate fault information until a new secrecy-preserving fault detection can be performed. A new recombination operation ensures randomization of the output in the case of a fault, ensuring that nothing can be learned from the faulty output. The security of the new scheme is proved in the ISW probing model, using the reformulated t-SNI security notion. Besides the new scheme and its security proof, we also present an extensive performance analysis, including a proof-of-concept, software-based AES implementation featuring the masking technique to resist both fault and side-channel attacks at the same time. The performance analysis for different security levels are given for the ARM-M0+ MCU with its memory requirements. A comprehensive leakage analysis shows that a careful implementation of the scheme achieves the expected security level.
2011
JOFC
2007
EUROCRYPT
2007
TCC
2005
CHES
2005
TCC
2003
CHES
2003
PKC
2003
PKC
2001
PKC
2001
PKC
2000
CRYPTO

Service

CHES 2025 Program committee
CHES 2023 Program committee
CHES 2022 Program committee
PKC 2020 Program committee
Asiacrypt 2017 Program committee
Asiacrypt 2016 Program committee
PKC 2015 Program committee
PKC 2012 Program committee
Eurocrypt 2009 Program committee
CHES 2009 Program committee
PKC 2008 Program committee
Crypto 2007 Program committee