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Statistical Ineffective Fault Attacks on Masked AES with Fault Countermeasures
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| Presentation: | Slides |
| Conference: | ASIACRYPT 2018 |
| Abstract: | Implementation attacks like side-channel and fault attacks are a threat to deployed devices especially if an attacker has physical access. As a consequence, devices like smart cards and IoT devices usually provide countermeasures against implementation attacks, such as masking against side-channel attacks and detection-based countermeasures like temporal or spacial redundancy against fault attacks. In this paper, we show how to attack implementations protected with both masking and detection-based fault countermeasures by using statistical ineffective fault attacks using a single fault induction per execution. Our attacks are largely unaffected by the deployed protection order of masking and the level of redundancy of the detection-based countermeasure. These observations show that the combination of masking plus error detection alone may not provide sufficient protection against implementation attacks. |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{asiacrypt-2018-29167,
title={Statistical Ineffective Fault Attacks on Masked AES with Fault Countermeasures},
booktitle={Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2018},
series={Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
publisher={Springer},
volume={11273},
pages={315-342},
doi={10.1007/978-3-030-03329-3_11},
author={Christoph Dobraunig and Maria Eichlseder and Hannes Gross and Stefan Mangard and Florian Mendel and Robert Primas},
year=2018
}