International Association
for Cryptologic Research

In the traditional consensus problem (aka Byzantine agreement), parties are required to agree on a common value despite the malicious behavior of some of them, subject to the condition that if all the honest parties start the execution with the same value, then that should be the outcome. This problem has been extensively studied by both the distributed computing and cryptographic protocols communities. With the advent of blockchains, whose main application---a distributed ledger---essentially requires that miners agree on their views, new techniques have been proposed to solve the problem, and in particular in so-called ``permissionless'' environments, where parties are not authenticated or have access to point-to-point channels and, further, may come and go as they please. So far, the fastest way to achieve consensus in the proof-of-work (PoW)-based setting of Bitcoin, takes O(polylog \kappa) number of rounds, where \kappa is the security parameter. We present the first protocol in this setting that requires expected-constant number of rounds. Furthermore, we show how to apply securely sequential composition in order to yield a fast distributed ledger protocol that settles all transactions in expected-constant time. Our result is based on a novel instantiation of ``m-for-1 PoWs'' on parallel chains that facilitates our basic building block, Chain-King Consensus. The techniques we use, via parallel chains, to port classical protocol design elements (such as Phase-King Consensus, super-phase sequential composition and others) into the permissionless setting may be of independent interest.

An important consideration in the context of distributed ledger protocols is fairness in terms of transaction ordering. Recent work [Crypto 2020] revealed a connection of (receiver) order fairness to social choice theory and related impossibility results arising from the Condorcet paradox. As a result of the impossibility, various relaxations of order fairness were proposed in prior works. Given that distributed ledger protocols, especially those processing smart contracts, must serialize the input transactions, a natural objective is to minimize the distance (in terms of number of transactions) between any pair of unfairly ordered transactions in the output ledger — a concept we call bounded unfairness. In state machine replication (SMR) parlance this asks for minimizing the number of unfair state updates occurring before the processing of any request. This unfairness minimization objective gives rise to a natural class of parametric order fairness definitions that has not been studied before. As we observe, previous realizable relaxations of order fairness do not yield good unfairness bounds. Achieving optimal order fairness in the sense of bounded unfairness turns out to be connected to the graph theoretic properties of the underlying transaction dependency graph and specifically the bandwidth metric of strongly connected components in this graph. This gives rise to a specific instance of the definition that we call ``directed bandwidth order-fairness'' which we show that it captures the best possible that any ledger protocol can achieve in terms of bounding unfairness. We prove ordering transactions in this fashion is NP-hard and non-approximable for any constant ratio. Towards realizing the property, we put forth a new distributed ledger protocol called Taxis that achieves directed bandwidth order-fairness. We present two variations, one that matches the property perfectly but (necessarily) lacks in performance and liveness, and another that achieves liveness and better complexity while offering a slightly relaxed version of the property. Finally, we comment on applications of our work to social choice theory, a direction which we believe to be of independent interest.

Order fairness in the context of distributed ledgers has received recently significant attention due to a range of attacks that exploit the reordering and adaptive injection of transactions (violating what is known as ``input causality''). To address such concerns an array of definitions for order fairness has been put forth together with impossibility and feasibility results highlighting the difficulty and multifaceted nature of fairness in transaction serialization. Motivated by this we present a comprehensive modeling of order fairness capitalizing on the universal composition (UC) setting. Our results capture the different flavors of sender order fairness and input causality (which is arguably one of the most critical aspects of ledger transaction processing with respect to serialization attacks) and we parametrically illustrate what are the limits of feasibility for realistic constructions via an impossibility result. Our positive result, a novel distributed ledger protocol utilizing trusted enclaves, complements tightly our impossibility result, hence providing an \emph{optimal} sender order fairness ledger construction that is also eminently practical.

The permissionless clock synchronization problem asks how it is possible for a population of parties to maintain a system-wide synchronized clock, while their participation rate fluctuates —possibly very widely— over time. The underlying assumption is that parties experience the passage of time with roughly the same speed, but however they may disengage and engage with the protocol following arbitrary (and even chosen adversarially) participation patterns. This (classical) problem has received renewed attention due to the advent of blockchain protocols, and recently it has been solved in the setting of proof of stake, i.e., when parties are assumed to have access to a trusted PKI setup [Badertscher et al., Eurocrypt ’21]. In this work, we present the first proof-of-work (PoW)-based permissionless clock synchro- nization protocol. Our construction relies on an honest majority of computational power that, for the first time, is described in a fine-grain timing model that does not utilize a global clock that exports the current time to all parties. As a secondary result of independent interest, our protocol gives rise to the first PoW-based ledger consensus protocol that does not rely on an external clock for the time-stamping of transactions and adjustment of the PoW difficulty.

A recent result by Dulek et al. (EUROCRYPT 2020) showed a secure protocol for computing any quantum circuit even without the presence of an honest majority. Their protocol, however, is susceptible to a ``denial of service'' attack and allows even a single corrupted party to force an abort. We propose the first quantum protocol that admits security-with-identifiable-abort, which allows the honest parties to agree on the identity of a corrupted party in case of an abort. Additionally, our protocol is the first to have the property that the number of rounds where quantum communication is required is independent of the circuit complexity. Furthermore, if there exists a post-quantum secure classical protocol whose round complexity is independent of the circuit complexity, then our protocol has this property as well. Our protocol is secure under the assumption that classical quantum-resistant fully homomorphic encryption schemes with decryption circuit of logarithmic depth exist. Interestingly, our construction also admits a reduction from quantum fair secure computation to classical fair secure computation.